Facebook Blogging

Edward Hugh has a lively and enjoyable Facebook community where he publishes frequent breaking news economics links and short updates. If you would like to receive these updates on a regular basis and join the debate please invite Edward as a friend by clicking the Facebook link at the top of the right sidebar.

Thursday, September 27, 2007

Turkey Sells $1.25 billion in dollar bonds

According to reuters this morning:

A sale of $1.25 billion in dollar bonds by Turkey suggested some stability was returning to debt markets, although signs of distress from the global credit crunch were still apparent.

U.S. student lender Sallie Mae said a consortium planning a $25 billion leveraged takeover did not expect to complete the deal on the agreed terms.

Sallie Mae's shares closed down 2.7 percent on Wednesday at $45.01 per share, almost $15 below the agreed takeover price as traders bet a lower price would be negotiated for the takeover.

The differing fortunes of Turkey's bond sale and Sallie Mae's takeover underlined the conclusions of the Financial Stability Forum, a global watchdog that met on Wednesday to discuss the credit squeeze that has caused turmoil in global markets.



I am especially interested in the comparative ease with which Turkey has been able to sell these bonds since on 5th September 2007 I argued the following:

This post is about Turkey, and it may be surprising in the light of what I have just said if I now go on to suggest that it is precisely the fact that Turkey may not be so badly ensnared in the trouble which is brewing (I mean no one, but no one, will escape completely scott free) as some other emerging economies (and I am talking here about some key members of the EU10 accession countries, and for reasons explained in this post)which may well be of interest.

The post which follows will be the first of four. Here I will simply look at some currency data, in an attempt to put my finger on the first crack which has appeared in the edifice of emerging market solidity. Later this week I will try to address Turkey's fundamentals as I see them, and explain why I feel there are grounds for some considerable optimism about Turkey's medium term economic future.
read more


So Turkey is indeed holding its ground while others begin to wilt. Interesting:

HUNGRY FOR TURKEY

Turkey boosted emerging market confidence, selling its bond due in 2018 at a yield of 2.216 percentage points over 10-year Treasuries. That was just above a yield of 2.18 points over Treasuries on 2020 bonds it sold in February.

Enrique Alvarez, an analyst at IDEAglobal, said the sale showed investor hunger for emerging market assets.

"Turkey was also helped by the fact that few countries have issued such bonds since the global credit crunch in July," he said.


To be continued.

Wednesday, September 26, 2007

Turkey Wages Q2 2007

According to the results of the wages index per-hour-worked and earnings index per-employee in manufacturing industry published by Turkstat; wages per-hour-worked in production increased by 8.9 %, earnings per-production-worker increased by 9.2% and earnings per non-production worker increased by 10.5% for the second quarter of 2007 over those of Q2 2006.

In public sector, wages per hour worked in production increased by 7.1 %, earnings per production worker increased by 9.9 % and earnings per non-production worker increased by 6.1 %. In the private sector, wages per hour worked in production increased by 9.5 %, earnings per production worker increased by 9.7 % and earnings per non-production worker increased by 10.8 %.

Here's the chart for the wages index:



and here are the annual rates for wages and earnings of production and non-production workers:

Electricity Prices in Turkey

Electricity prices in Turkey are now below the cost of production, and Morgan Stanley's Serhan Cevik is not a happy man:

After lowering electricity prices by 6.4% in 2003, the Turkish government has kept the tariff structure unchanged in the last four years, providing an outright subsidy to the rest of the economy as the price of oil soared from an average of US$25.3 in 2002 to US$68.6 this year. It may have scored well with the voters, but the cost of keeping electricity prices artificially low has become an enormous burden on public finances and even on the current account. Although there are no official data on the cost of electricity production, we can estimate the changes from the breakdown of generation methods. Fossil fuels account for 75% of total electricity production in Turkey, which makes it susceptible to the price of oil. In the past four years, the average price Turkey paid for imported crude oil increased by 180% in lira terms and the price of natural gas increased by 65% in the domestic market. On the other hand, industrial and household electricity prices remained unchanged over this period. As a result, electricity prices in Turkey are now almost half of the European average. In our view, Turkey can no longer maintain such an irrational pricing scheme without creating even more distortions throughout the economy.
Read more

Turkey Consumer Confidence Index August 2006

According to Turkstat, in the monthly Consumer Tendency Survey, the Consumer Confidence Index, which was 95.49 in July 2007, increased by 2.88% compared to July 2007 and became 98.25 in August 2007. Here is the chart:

Wednesday, September 19, 2007

CBRT Lowers Interest Rates

The CBRT decided last week to lower Turkish interest rates, reducing the overnight borrowing rate from 17.50 to 17.25 percent,. According to the press release:
Readings on economic activity and inflation are in line with the outlook presented in the July Inflation Report. While private consumption and investment demand exhibits signs of recovery, external demand moderates. Aggregate demand conditions continue to support the disinflation process. The Committee assesses that developments in services inflation have been more favorable than expected. Notwithstanding the risks related to energy and food prices, inflation is expected to further decelerate owing to the lagged effects of strong monetary tightening.

The Committee closely monitors the developments in international liquidity conditions and credit markets. In the meeting, the Committee evaluated the recent data, and assessed that global developments are likely to restrain both the domestic and external demand growth, increasing the downward risks on achieving the 4 percent target in the medium term.

In this respect, the Committee decided that current conditions require launchingthe measured rate cuts mentioned in the Inflation Report. The Committee underlines that the current monetary policy stance continues to be restrictive. The exact timing and extent of further easing may vary depending on the incoming information regarding global liquidity conditions, external demand, public expenditures and other determinants of medium term inflation outlook.



Serhan Cevik comments:

With an unexpected decision, the Central Bank of Turkey lowered interest rates by 25bp to 17.25% last week. What is surprising about the start of the monetary easing campaign is its timing. After all, the central bank over-tightened the policy stance by 425bp to 17.5% last summer in an attempt to rebuild credibility and rein in the inflationary impact of the lira’s sudden depreciation. As expected, maintaining such an ultra-tight monetary policy stance for more than a year has moderated growth in domestic demand, helped in strengthening the exchange rate and gradually improved inflation dynamics. This is why we have long argued for the coming normalisation of interest rates, expecting a gradual easing cycle towards 16.5-16.75% by the end of this year and around 14.5-15% in 2008. However, with the recent volatility in global financial markets and the rise in energy and food prices, we revised our expectation for the start of monetary easing from a 25bp reduction in September to a 50bp cut in October (or even possibly November). We thought that a higher degree of global uncertainty warranted a more cautious approach, even though slower growth in the world economy may well have disinflationary effects over the medium term (see The Case of Gradualism, August 6, 2007). Obviously, the central bank thought otherwise and moved ahead with the first rate cut. Could this lead to a dislocation, especially since we were calling for a rate cut next month? The problem is not whether domestic factors justify the easing, but the emergence of new risks along with higher energy and food prices.



Actually, if we look at what is happening to the Lira this morning, following the Federal Reserve decision yesterday, then we can think of another interpretation for this decision, and that is to reduce the speculative inflow of funds during the uncertainty and volatility which is surely going to follow the lowering of the federal funds rate:

Turkey's lira gained by the most in almost two months against the dollar as the Federal Reserve decision to cut interest rates spurred investors' appetite for riskier, emerging-market assets.

The lira, the best performer in the past month, rose with other emerging-market currencies such as Iceland's krona and Hungary's forint after the Fed cut its benchmark rate to 4.75 percent, pushing global equity markets higher. Turkey's ISE National 100 Index advanced 3.5 percent.


Obviously the argument about a lowering in US interest rates increasing the appetite for riskier assets doesn't make any sense at all, since it seems to imply that a US recession may be on the way, and this would normal produce a safe haven mentality. The point is, where will the safe havens be this time round? One of my arguments here on this blog is that in fact Turkey - despite its exposure to a slowdown in Europe - may well be able to weather the storm better than others, although I am not at all convinced that financial market participants can see this at this point. Evidence for that might be the fact they are buying the Hungarian forint too, and that is a very different story indeed.

Turkey Labour Force Survey June 2007

The latest version of the Labour Force Survey is now out.

While non-institutional civilian population increased by 925 thousand persons and has reached to 73 million 492 thousand persons, non-institutional working age civilian population has increased by 837 thousand and has reached to 52 million 484 thousand persons in the period of June 2007.

Number of employed persons increased by 381 thousand persons compared to the same period of the previous year and has reached to 23 million 581 thousand persons in the period of June 2007. Agricultural employment decreased by 72 thousand persons and non-agricultural employment increased by 453 thousand persons in this period.

Number of unemployed persons increased by 40 thousand persons compared to the same period of the previous year and has reached to 2 million 285 thousand persons in Turkey. Unemployment rate was realized without any change as 8,8%. Unemployment rate declined to 11,1% with a 0,1 percentage points decrease in urban areas and realized without any change as 5,5 % in rural areas.


Non-agricultural unemployment rate is realized without any change as 11,5 % compared to the same period of the previous year in Turkey. The rate is also realized without any change as 10,3 % for male and 16,6 % with a 0,1 percentage points increase for female.

The ratio of persons who worked without any social security related to the main job declined to 48,6 % with 1,7 percentage points decrease. The share of persons who did not have any social security in agriculture decreased from 88,2 % to 88,1 % and that in non-agriculture decreased from 34,6 % to 32,8 % compared to the same period of the previous year.

Labour force participation rate (LFPR) realized without any change as 49,3 % compared to the same period of the previous year for Turkey in June 2007 period. LFPR was increased to 72,4 % with a 0,1 percentage points increase for male and realized without any change as 26,6 % for female. LFPR was 46 % with a 0,3 percentage point increase in urban areas and 55,1 % with a 0,3 percentage points decrease in rural areas in this period. As for the distribution of labour force by education and age group;



Here's a useful chart from Turkstat:


Sectoral distribution of employment, (In Thousand)


Sunday, September 16, 2007

The Current Outlook

Historically Turkey’s large financing requirements have made it particularly vulnerable to any sudden change in sentiment via a grinding to a halt in capital inflows, and what were perceived as weaker fundamentals than those which pertained in other emerging market economies (a large and widening current account deficit; a still high gross public debt ratio tilted towards instruments with adjustable rates or short maturities; and an uncertain inflation outlook) have often exposed Turkey to a sudden reversal of capital inflows.

The core argument of my recent extensive review of Turkey's current situation is that this situation need not be like this in the future. History is not condemned simply to repeat and repeat itself. There is evolution, and there is development. Again, if we look at the most recent one month chart for the euro-lira cross, we will observe that this time round Turkey continues to resist the pressure tolerably well:




(Since this chart is a measure of the number of lira per euro, the downward movement indicates a rise in the value of the lira vis a vis the euro).

True, with bank base rates at 17.25%, there may be good reason to expect the lira to appear robust you may say. The point is that Turkey is experiencing extremely tight monetary conditions and managing to maintain a relatively healthy annual GDP growth rate (an annualised rate of 5.3% over the first six months of this year), while Hungary, for example, which has a central bank base rate of 8%, is plummeting rapidly downwards into recession. It is the reason why the Turkish economy is exhibiting this resilience at this point which is what should be interesting us.

One of the explanations for this positive upside surprise would undoubtedly be Turkey's strong underlying productivity position. The history of the tiger phenomenon has clearly shown us that that factor accumulation alone, without accompanying efficiency gains, does not bring sustainable economic growth and rapid increases in per capita living standards. In Turkey’s case, however, productivity improvements have been one of the most under-appreciated aspects of the post-2001-crisis performance, and have been one of the principal drivers of the longest stretch of uninterrupted output growth in Turkey's history. In the pre June 2006 crisis period productivity growth had been steadily accelerating - reaching an annual rate of 8.5% towards the end of 2005, for example.

Output per worker surged at a year-on-year rate of 8.5% in the fourth quarter of 2005, up from 6.1% in the third quarter and 3.8% in the first half. Even in terms of output per-hour worked, the rate of productivity growth accelerated from an average of 4.7% in the first half of 2005 to 7.2% in the second half (and 8.4% in the last three months) of the year. This sustained productivity acceleration, as well as providing greater impetus to output growth, was also a big factor behind the massive disinflation which lead Turkey towards single-digit inflation territory. The rise in output per hour-worked in the manufacturing sector was somewhere in the region of 38% in the 2001-2006 period, easily outpacing the 32.5% rise in real GDP.

Also the 187.7% real increase in business investment spending on machinery and equipment over the same period - a reading which compares impressively with a "mere" 24.2% increase in construction expenditures — raised the capital/labour ratio and laid the basis for higher trend productivity growth in the longer run. The consequence of all this was that Turkey’s total factor productivity growth accelerated from an average of 0.5% a year in the 1990s to 4.8% in the post-crisis period, and this productivity boom will continue improving the quality and sustainability of non-inflationary output growth.

Fortunately, both the Turkish nation and the world at large have singularly and notably paid little heed to the strange warning which appeared on the Turkish military website to the effect that the nation was in peril. The nation is in fact in full health, and, guess what, a headscarf is simply that, something you wear on your head. As we have seen the only thing which may really be in peril is a privileged "insider" position in the old institutional structure, built up, strangely enough, via access to pension systems, their benefits, and the control which the consequent funds exercised over the old, tremendously inefficient, state sector.

Even so, some might have assumed given the past record, that a stand up fight between an elected Turkish government and the Turkish military might have negatively affected investor confidence, especially given the way in which the 2001 economic crisis was kicked-off by an apparently minor row between the then President - Ahmet Necdet Sezer - and the coalition government, all aided and abetted, of course, by a thoroughly rotten banking system. Yet in May of this year, when the AKP government undertook the initial public offering of 25% of the publicly owned Halkbank, it fetched $1.85bn, was seven times over-subscribed and finished trading the next day at an 11% premium. Something, it seems has changed. To plagiarize one former US president, it's the demography, silly!

Looked at another way, we could ask ourselves whether the reason why Citigroup paid a substantial sum of money (some would say an exceptionally generous sum) for a minority share in another Turkish bank (Citigroup paid $3.1 billion for a 20 percent stake in Akbank and indeed have only this month acquired the Turkish brokerage house Opus Menhul Degerler) earlier this year has anything to do with the fact that Turkey is actually the last pristine European market? At a time when investors across the globe are concerned about problems thought to be associated with the US subprime mortgage market, it should not escape our notice that house loans in Turkey are still a relatively new phenomenon - and constitute only 4% of GDP (compared to a European average of around 40%). Citicorp is not the only recent bank sector participant to enter the Turkish market, since the ING Groep, who are based in Amsterdam, agreed in June to pay $2.67 billion for Oyak Bank.

And there are more than banks to sell. Even while Prime Minister Recep Erdogan, who ironically chose a shining light bulb as a symbol for the AKP, struggles to keep electrical power generation on as the largely state-owned Turkish electricity industry continues to have trouble coping with high summer demand amid record heat it is worth reminding ourselves that Turkey needs all that extra power because its factories are humming, and because the ever wealthier Turks are demanding more and better services after 21 straight quarters of economic growth.

We should also remind ourselves that his recent electoral victory gives Erdogan the freedom to step up the sale of state companies and push for new foreign investment, so he can safely now proceed with plans to privatize the power companies. So the short term crisis has a solution, and in this case the reach of the new government may well not exceed its grasp. ie the problem, like so many others in the new Turkey, has a solution, and thus is likely to be solved.

Erdogan has made it very clear that one of the things he wants to do, in the light of the election results (nice pun that) is to put Turkey's power stations, regional electricity grids and the national lottery all up for auction. This follows decisions earlier this year, to sell the right to operate a group of airports in Istanbul and the resort city Antalya for $5.8 billion. Also in July, after years of delay, Petkim Petrokimya Holding, a state-owned chemicals maker, was sold for $2.05 billion to a group of Russian and Kazakh investors.

As a result, foreign direct investment rose to a record $19.8 billion in 2006 and has already totaled $11 billion for the first five months of 2007.

In the chronic inflation which characterized the domestic environment up until 2001, Turks simply did not borrow, or perhaps - better put - few would willingly lend to them. Consumer loans are currently 20 times higher then they were four years ago, although they still only constitute some 6-7% of GDP, while European averages are in the 35-40% region. As someone once said, there's gold in them there hills (the Anatolian ones, of course) and plenty of it, so let's go and dig. And as for me, ah, well now it really is time to go and smell the coffee.

Monday, September 10, 2007

Turkey Industrial Output July 2007

Details of the monthly production index are now out from Turkstat. The index increased by 3,5 % in July of 2007 when compared with July 2006. Despite weak domestic demand out put has now recovered from the drop earlier in the year (although month on month we are still down slightly from June) and the level is now above that for the same period in 2006. Given the very tight monetary conditions prevailing this cannot be considered a bad result. Here is the chart for output since the start of 2006.

Turkey Q2 2007 GDP

Data for Q2 2007 Turkish GDP were released today by Turkstat.

The second quarter growth rate of gross national product in 2007 compared to the same quarter of previous year has increased 3.9% in constant prices. The second quarter growth rate of gross national product in 2007 has increased by 10.5% to 148 110 million New Turkish Liras in current prices when gross national product has increased by 19.4% to 110 264 million USA dollar.The second quarter growth rate of gross national product in 2007 has increased by 3.9% to 38.9 million New Turkish Liras in constant prices.



Perhaps the most interesting details are the following ones: Q2 growth in private final consumption was negative - -0.3% - government final consumption expenditure grew at 7.4%, gross fixed capital formation at 10.0%, exports of goods and services 12.7 %, and imports of goods and services 8.4%, all of these as measured in constant prices. Here's an updated quarterly GDP chart:



And here are the tables giving the detailed breakdown, as supplied by Turkstat.


I.a. Gross national product results by production approach

GNP

Current prices

Growth rate

GNP

Current prices

Growth rate

GNP

Constant prices

Growth rate

Quarter

New Turkish Liras

%

(Million USA$)

%

New Turkish Liras

%

I

107 510 993 818

13.8

80 651

13.1

31 625 722

6.4

II

134 019 473 702

22.4

92 356

15.1

37 455 914

9.3

III

177 706 868 605

18.9

119 238

7.1

47 191 041

4.3

IV

156 546 626 011

17.8

107 428

9.6

38 070 043

4.6

2006

Annual

575 783 962 136

18.4

399 673

10.8

154 342 719

6.0

I*

129 321 243 406

20.3

91 574

13.5

33 787 316

6.8

II

148 110 192 435

10.5

110 264

19.4

38 908 124

3.9

2007

6 months

277 431 435 841

14.9

201 837

16.7

72 695 440

5.2

I.b. Gross domestic product results by production approach

GDP

Current prices

Growth rate

GDP

Current prices

Growth rate

GDP

Constant prices

Growth rate

Quarter

New Turkish Liras

%

(Million USA$)

%

New Turkish Liras

%

I

107 768 604 282

13.8

80 844

13.2

31 978 940

6.7

II

133 790 851 171

21.4

92 183

14.1

37 614 899

8.3

III

177 905 779 725

19.0

119 376

7.2

47 624 611

4.8

IV

156 856 995 687

18.1

107 642

9.9

38 514 044

5.2

2006

Annual

576 322 230 865

18.3

400 046

10.7

155 732 493

6.1

I*

129 586 986 949

20.2

91 762

13.5

34 184 933

6.9

II

148 001 181 872

10.6

110 189

19.5

39 094 893

3.9

2007

6 months

277 588 168 821

14.9

201 951

16.7

73 279 826

5.3

II. Growth rate of sectors in 2006 by production approach (%)

Current Prices Constant Prices

Sectors

I. Quarter*

II. Quarter

6 months

I. Quarter*

II. Quarter

6 months

Agriculture

14.8

7.5

10.5

4.4

-1.1

0.9

Industry

21.9

8.9

14.5

7.5

3.2

5.2

Construction

41.5

29.3

34.5

16.5

15.7

16.1

Trade

20.9

6.4

12.6

6.6

3.0

4.6

Transportation and Communication

16.9

10.2

13.2

5.5

4.7

5.1

Financial Institutions

18.2

20.6

19.5

8.3

6.2

7.3

Ownership of Dwelling

22.4

22.8

22.6

2.4

2.4

2.4

Business and Personal Services

19.1

11.4

14.9

4.7

3.8

4.2

Government Services

18.4

11.6

14.9

1.3

1.3

1.3

Private Non-Profit Institutions

18.9

-

12.3

1.2

-1.1

-0.1

Import Duties

13.0

-

4.2

9.8

8.6

9.2

Gross Domestic Product

20.2

10.6

14.9

6.9

3.9

5.3

Gross National Product

20.3

10.5

14.9

6.8

3.9

5.2

III. Growth rate of expenditure groups in 2006 (%)

Current Prices Constant Prices

Expenditure Groups

I. Quarter*

II. Quarter

6 months

I. Quarter*

II. Quarter

6 months

Private Final Consumption Expenditure

12.6

6.8

9.4

2.0

-0.3

0.8

Government Final Consumption Expenditure

21.0

13.9

17.2

9.0

7.4

8.1

Gross Fixed Capital Formation

24.6

20.1

22.0

3.0

10.0

6.9

Exports of Goods and Services

31.4

13.5

21.1

14.7

12.7

13.6

Imports of Goods and Services

25.3

7.7

15.2

4.3

8.4

6.5